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ABSTRACT: Editors’  introduction to the special issue on the Causality and Explanation in the Sciences conference, held at 
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Causality and causal inference play a central role in the sciences. Explanation is one of 
the central goals of scientific research. And scientific explanation requires causal 
knowledge. At least, these are well-known tenets in present-day philosophy of science.  
 In September 2011, philosophers of science, logicians, mathematicians, biologists, 
social scientists, computer scientists and the like gathered at Ghent University to dis-
cuss the relation between causality and explanation: Causality and Explanation in the Sci-
ences (CaEitS2011).1 In the course of three days, a range of topics were discussed. Dif-
ferent accounts of causality and explanation, such as Jim Woodward’s interventionist 
account, Michael Strevens’ kairetic account, and the mechanistic account. The relation 
between causality, explanation and understanding. The nature and status of causality 
and explanation in biology, in the social sciences, in medicine, in physics and in math-
ematics. The relation between causal and constitutive explanation. How causal rela-
tions can be discovered and what we can infer from our causal knowledge. Etc. 
 Causality and Explanation in the Sciences was the sixth episode in the Causality in the Sci-
ences series of conferences which originated at the University of Kent.2 Other confer-
ences focussed on causality and probability in the sciences, on mechanisms and cau-
sality in the sciences, or on causality in the biomedical and the social sciences. In Sep-
tember 2012, the University of Kent will host the seventh episode: Evidence and Cau-
sality in the Sciences (ECitS2012). 
 Papers presented at the previous CitS conferences have resulted in interesting pub-
lications. So far, two book volumes have appeared: Federica Russo & Jon Williamson 
(eds.), Causality and Probability in the Sciences (London: College Publications, 2007), and 
Phyllis McKay Illari, Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (eds.), Causation in the Sciences 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Moreover, a special issue on causality in the 
                                                     
1 See http://www.caeits2011.ugent.be/ [accessed on May 1, 2012]. 
2 See http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/cits.htm [accessed on May 1, 2012]. 
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biomedical and social sciences will be published in Studies in History and Philosophy of Sci-
ence. 
 True to this tradition, we proudly present a first selection of papers from Causality 
and Explanation in the Sciences (CaEitS2011) in this issue of Theoria. In addition, a num-
ber of other selected papers will be published in Erkenntnis. 
 The first three papers in this issue each focus on issues concerning causality and 
explanation in a particular scientific discipline: the social sciences, epigenetics, and 
climate science. We will start with the social sciences. At what level should we expect 
social causation to operate: at the social macro-level or at the individual micro-level? 
And what is the relation between these two levels?  In “Explanatory Autonomy and 
Coleman’s Boat,” Daniel Little opposes this dualistic micro-macro view: we also need 
to include a range of meso-level causal relations. But this still leaves open the question 
about the relation between these levels. Therefore, Little investigates whether an ac-
tor-centered social ontology can admit of relatively autonomous social causal explana-
tions. He endorses the requirement that social structures and causes require “micro-
foundations” and argues that the examples of other special sciences demonstrate the 
validity of the idea of “relative explanatory autonomy” in the case of social causal rea-
soning. These considerations provide a basis for affirming the legitimacy of causal 
statements about meso-level causal powers and relations. The result is a ‘limited but 
significant amendment’ to the agenda of analytic sociology and its model of social cau-
sation represented by Coleman’s boat. 
 In his “Causal explanation beyond the gene: manipulation and causality in epige-
netics,” Jan Baedke deals with the interrelationship between causal explanation and 
methodology in the relatively young discipline of epigenetics. Epigenetics basically 
represents a heterogeneous field that focuses on non-genetic inheritance phenomena. 
It thus challenges gene centrism and asks for a broader notion of heredity that should 
be taken into consideration for inheritance and evolution. Based on cases from mo-
lecular and ecological epigenetics, Baedke shows that Jim Woodward’s interventionist 
account of causation captures essential features about how epigeneticists using highly 
diverse methods, i.e. laboratory experiments and purely observational studies, think 
about causal explanation. He argues that interventionism thus qualifies as a useful uni-
fying explanatory approach when it comes to cross-methodological research efforts: It 
can act as a guiding rationale (i) to link causal models in molecular biology with statis-
tical models derived from observational data analysis and (ii) to identify test-criteria 
for reciprocal transparent studies in different fields of research, which is a shared issue 
across the sciences.  
 In the third paper, “The key role of causal explanation in the climate change issue,” 
Francesca Pongiglione argues that the adoption of pro-environment behaviour in the 
context of climate change is favoured by the understanding of causal passages within 
climate science. Tackling climate change is not only a matter of reaching international 
agreements imposing limits on CO2 emissions. Psychologists and behavioural scien-
tists have started giving increasing attention to the role of individual behaviour in the-
se matters and to the elements that influence the decision process that leads individu-
als to adopt pro-environment behaviour: personal values, attitudes and moral norms, 
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risk perception and knowledge among many others. In this paper, Pongiglione focuses 
in particular on the role of causal knowledge. The understanding of the causes of cli-
mate change is necessary in order to be able to take mitigation actions (the subject 
needs to be aware of its role as a causal agent). Conversely, the understanding of the 
consequences of climate change is essential for rationally managing the risks, especially 
in cases where adaptation is needed rather than simple mitigation. The case of ozone 
depletion confirms this view: the understanding of its causal dynamics played a major 
role in people’s behavioural response.  
 In the fourth paper, “Warranting the use of causal claims: a non-trivial case for in-
terdisciplinarity,” Menno Rol and Nancy Cartwright also focus on the role of causal 
knowledge in policy, and on the conditions that should be satisfied for causal claims 
to be useful in a given case. Oftentimes, inaccurate inferences are made about target 
policy situations based on scientific studies – even good scientific studies – as Rol and 
Cartwright show by means of a couple of examples (such as the failed Bangladesh In-
tegrated Nutrition Program, BINP, which was based on a Tamil Nadu project, TINP). 
The usual diagnosis is that the studies in question lack ‘external validity’, which means 
that the same results do not hold in the target as in the study. But that’s a label that 
just repeats what we already knew, Rol and Cartwright argue. As a remedy, they offer 
a deeper analysis in which they isolate two reasons why inferences from study to target 
fail. First, policy variables do not produce results on their own; they need helping fac-
tors. The distribution of helping factors is likely to be unique or local for each study, 
so one cannot expect external validity to be all that common. Second, researchers of-
ten give too concrete a description of the cause in the study for it to carry over to the 
target. Abstraction is necessary to get causes that travel. There is no sure-fire way to 
guard against these problems. But the unavailability of one perfect tool does not imply 
there are no second best contrivances. This analysis points to the need for interdisci-
plinarity and to the demand to focus not on the study – as the expression ‘external va-
lidity’ invites you to do – but on the target. The call for interdisciplinary approaches to 
real life problems is common since it is widely acknowledged that what happens in the 
real world seldom falls under the auspices of any single research domain. In short, two 
general pointers for Good Practice in policy advice follow from their diagnosis: focus 
on the concrete details in the target and use cross discipline heuristics that diversify 
background knowledge. 
 Finally, Lorenzo Casini tackles the topic of causality at a more abstract level, viz. 
from an inferentialist viewpoint. According to the inferentialist view of causality, cau-
sality is a sort of ‘inference licence’. The meaning of causal claims is constituted by 
and analysable in terms of the rules of inference they obey (inferences to sentences 
that warrant the causal claims as well as inferences to sentences that are warranted by 
them). In his “Causation: Many Words, One Thing?”, Casini asks how many notions 
of cause there are. The causality literature is witnessing a flourishing of pluralist posi-
tions. Focussing on a recent debate on whether interpreting causality in terms of in-
ferential relations commits one to semantic pluralism (as Julian Reiss has argued re-
cently) or not (as Jon Williamson claims), Casini argues that inferentialism is compati-
ble with a ‘weak’ form of monism, where causality is envisaged as one, vague cluster 
Causality and Explanation in the Sciences 
Theoria 74 (2012): 133-136 
136
concept. He offers two arguments for this claim, one for vagueness, one for unique-
ness. Finally, he qualifies in what sense the resulting form of monism is ‘weak’. It is 
weak because the issue of what ‘causes’ means cannot be settled once and for all, by 
either scientists or philosophers. If our concepts are dynamic, only partly constrained 
by our practices and Nature’s inputs and outputs to such practices, we can only try to 
interpret concepts on-the-fly. 
 To conclude, we would like to thank a number of people and organizations with-
out the help and support of whom CaEitS2011 would not have taken place. First of 
all, we thank the other members of the CitS steering committee (Phyllis Illari, Julian 
Reiss, Federica Russo and Jon Williamson) and Leen De Vreese for their help in care-
fully selecting the speakers of our conference. Second, we thank our keynote speakers, 
Nancy Cartwright, Daniel Little, Henk de Regt, Mauricio Suárez and Michael Strevens 
for their contributions at the conference. Several members of the Centre for Logic 
and Philosophy of Science of Ghent University helped us enormously with the practi-
cal organization. Financial support was provided by the Fund for Scientific Research – 
Flanders (FWO), the Faculty of Arts & Philosophy of Ghent University, and the Spe-
cial Research Fund (BOF) of Ghent University.  
 We would also like to thank a number of people for their help with this special is-
sue: the contributing authors for their interesting submissions, the reviewers for their 
most helpful reports, and last but not least, David Teira and José Díez for hospitably 
welcoming us in Theoria and for their tremendous support during the whole reviewing 
and editing process. 
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